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I .  INTRODUCTION 
Respondents dismiss the harm they caused to Wesco as the result of coincidence - the 
coincidence that all of Wesco's newly-acquired Idaho employees chose at the same moment, 
without notice or warning, to resign and join Wesco's competitor, leaving Wesco incapable of 
operating. The evidence demonstrates that this was no "coincidence" and was, instead, the 
product of an unlawful scheme. 
When Brady Barkdull learned that Wesco would stop ordering supplies for its newly- 
acquired Idaho stores from Automotive Paint Warehouse ("APW), an entity controlled by 
Respondents Holly Ernest and Tom Davis, he immediately met with Ernest and Davis to inform 
them of this fact. Faced with the prospect of losing this business, Ernest and Davis resolved to 
open stores in competition with Wesco through their existing company, Paint & Spray Supply, 
Inc. ("P&S'3 and offered Barkdull a job as general manager of those stores. 
Ernest and Davis understood that Wesco, as the very recent purchaser of the Idaho stores, 
was vulnerable - that it was not "as well prepared as it needed to be." They concluded that they 
needed to move quickly, while Wesco was still vulnerable. Part of their strategy was to approach 
the key employees of Wesco's new stores and offer them jobs. Ernest and Davis acted with the 
purpose of harming Wesco - to keep it from being "as well prepared as it needed to be," to 
compete. Wesco's departing employees knew that a mass defection would have a "fairly 
negative impact on Wesco's ability to continue in operation." 
Barkdull allegedly did not immediately respond to P&S's offer of employment. Instead, 
"Barkdull wanted to know what the other [Wesco] employees were going to do before he made 
up his mind." Barkdull nonetheless "made it clear to [Emest] that if [Ernest] were able to solicit 
these other employees he'd go with [P&S]." This evidences a clear agreement ("concerted 
action") by Barkdull, Ernest, and Davis that Barkdull, the prized "general manager," would leave 
Wesco's employment if Ernest and Davis succeeded in stealing enough employees from Wesco, 
and Barkdull's support, acquiescence and ratification of Ernest and Davis's subsequent 
recruitment of nearly all of Wesco's employees. Despite knowledge of Ernest and Davis's 
activities and intentions, Barkdull denied any intention of leaving Wesco to join forces with 
Ernest and Davis when confkonted by Wesco's vice president. Barkdull had a duty to speak but 
failed to do so when Wesco might still have learned of, and averted or otherwise mitigated, the 
mass defection. Instead, Barkdull himself instructed the departing Wesco employees to tender 
their resignations en masse at the close of business on Friday, August 19, 2005, presenting 
Wesco with a fait accompli. 
Employees who depart abruptly en masse, leaving their employer in the lurch, breach 
their duty of loyalty. Employees who solicit other employees to leave also breach that duty. 
Wesco presented substantial evidence that this duty was breached, and the trial court erred in 
limiting the range of actions that a jury might conclude breached the duty. 
A competitor is not privileged to interfere with even an at-will employment relationship 
by using "improper means" or by interfering for an "improper purpose." There is a triable issue 
as to whether Ernest, Davis and P&S employed improper means to interfere with Wesco's 
relationship with its employees by inducing those employees to breach their duty of loyalty and 
reaping the benefits of that breach. There is also a triable issue as to whether Ernest, Davis and 
P&S interfered for the improper purpose of inflicting harm on Wesco by making it incapable of 
operating its Idaho stores for want of qualified employees. The trial court erred in dismissing 
claims against Ernest, Davis and P&S. 
The trial court also erred in dismissing claims for tortious interference with Wesco's 
contracts with its employees and its customers. The sole basis on which the trial court dismissed 
these claims was that it deemed each of these contracts terminable "at-will." However, the law is 
clear that a competitor may be liable for tortious interference even with at-will contracts. 
Without this categorical shield, there is a triable issue whether Ernest, Davis and P&S employed 
unlawful means or sought an improper purpose. Accordingly, this Court should deny 
Respondents' cross-appeal, reverse the trial court's granting of summary judgment and remand 
for trial. 
11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Response to Respondents' Alternate Statement. 
Because Respondents cross-appealed the trial court's denial of its renewed motion for 
summary judgment, Wesco submits the following analysis and counter statement. 
Ernest and Davis heard about Wesco's purchase of Paint & Equipment and Wesco's 
intention not to use APW to supply the Idaho stores from Barkdull in a meeting in Tremonton, 
Utah, on or around August 12, 2005. R. Vol. 111, pp. 433 (16:s-13); Id. p. 457 (17:4-24). 
According to Davis, he and Ernest offered Barkdull a job at the Tremonton meeting. Id. pp. 458- 
59 (18~13-1916). 
Ernest and Davis understood that Wesco, as the "newcomer" to the area, was vulnerable. 
Wesco likely was "not. . . as well prepared as it needed to be." Resp. Br. at 10. They concluded 
that they needed to move quickly, while Wesco was still vulnerable, Id., and "[plart of their 
strategy was to approach the key employees of Wesco's new stores and offer them jobs," Id. In 
other words, Ernest and Davis acted with the purpose of harming Wesco - to keep it from being 
"as well prepared as it needed to be." Id. Wesco's departing employees knew that a mass 
defection would have a "fairly negative impact on Wesco's ability to continue in operation." 
R. Vol. 111, p. 497 (37:25-385). 
Ernest, Davis and Barkdull agree that Barkdull did not immediately respond to P&S's 
offer of employment. Instead, "Barkdull wanted to know what the other employees were going 
to do before he made up his mind." Id. at 4. "He was very clear that if in fact the others went he 
would probably go also." R. Vol. 111, p. 442 (25:ll-12). Barkdull "made it clear to [Ernest] that 
if [Ernest] were able to solicit these other employees he'd go with [P&S]." Id. (25:16-18). At a 
minimum this testimony indicates knowledge by Barkdull that Ernest and Davis would be 
soliciting other key employees at Wesco's Idaho stores. It is also clearly an agreement 
("concerted action") by Barkdull, Ernest and Davis that Barkdull, the prized "general manager," 
would leave Wesco's employment if Ernest and Davis succeeded in stealing enough employees 
from Wesco. 
Throughout Respondents' brief, Ernest and Davis claim that they did not ask Barkdull to 
recruit other Wesco employees. E.g., Resp. Br. at 4. But, the alleged factual support for this 
claim is thin. Id. In fact, the only support for this claim is Barkdull's after-the-fact declaration 
in support of summary judgment, R. Vol. 111, p. 578, which fails to acknowledge the "nudge 
nudge" and "wink wink" agreement that Barkdull would go with P&S if Ernest and Davis 
recruited enough of Wesco's key personnel. Under this agreement, the fact that Barkdull 
allegedly did not himself make offers to Wesco personnel (something he had no power to do) is 
irrelevant. Barkdull ratified and acquiesced in Ernest and Davis's solicitation and failed (at a 
time when he claims he was not "making preparations to compete") to wam Wesco that P&S 
was recruiting its key personnel for the purpose of depriving Wesco of the ability to compete 
against brand new P&S stores. 
While Barkdull allegedly had not yet made up his mind, and therefore could not claim 
that he was "preparing to compete," he nonetheless spoke with Ernest at least 64 times. R. Vol. 
11, pp. 182-95. On August 13, 2005, Barkdull met with Ernest to scout out potential store sites 
for P&S/APW. R. Vol. 111, pp. 437-42 (20:3-25:22). While still a Wesco employee, Barkdull 
called realtors, title companies and planning and zoning authorities to locate store sites. R. Vol. 
11, p. 191; R. Vol. 111, pp. 546-48. Barkdull admits calling High Desert Realty on August 17 and 
19, 2005, to assist APW, d/b/a P&S, in locating retail locations in Pocatello, Twin Falls and 
Idaho Falls. R. Vol. Ill, pp. 546-48. He also contacted planning and building departments in 
those locations to obtain a business license. Id. 
Respondents claim that "[wlhen Barkdull first discusses the possible job switch with 
other employees, it is after the other employees have already made up their minds to quit." Resp. 
Br. at 4. The only citation to the record supporting this statement is to the deposition testimony 
of David Cristobal, R. Vol. IV, p. 615, and the citation does not support the claim. Instead, all 
Mr. Cristobal states is that he did not call Barkdull or Earnest to tell them that he had decided to 
quit.' Id. Respondents also claim that Jenny Hancock made it "very clear" that her decision to 
leave "was not based on pressure from Barkdull" and that she "specifically denied that Brady 
' The same claim is made at Resp. Br. at 5 - that the "employees did not discuss their decision 
with Barkdull until after they had made up their minds to quit." The only support is the same 
irrelevant quotation from Mr. Cristobal's deposition. 
5 
recruited her." But, the citations to the record do not support this claim. In R. Vol. V, p. 879, 
Ms. Hancock simply denied requests that she admit that "Paint & Spray Supply, Inc., acting 
through Brady Barkdull, dictated your conduct in leaving Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc.," and 
that she was "following orders from Brady Barkdull." A denial of a request for admission is not 
evidence. At R. Vol. 111, p. 494, Ms. Hancock acknowledged discussing the matter with Shelby 
Thompson and Ernest and Davis, but did not deny that Barkdull recruited her, "specifically" or 
otherwise. And, she admits, as do Barkdull, Ernest and Davis, that Barkdull attended the dinner 
at which Ernest and Davis made her an offer. Id, p. 494 (239-23). 
Much is claimed by Respondents that the departing employees had grown to "distrust" 
Wesco. See, e.g., Resp. Br. at 8. That vastly overstates the proof. Few of the employees 
testified to any "distrust." Moreover, although Respondents claim concern "about being bought 
by an out of state corporation," Resp. Br. at 11, at the time Wesco bought Paint & Equipment, 
Paint & Equipment had a total of ten stores, only three of which were in Idaho - the balance 
were in Oregon and Washington. T. Vol. 111, p. 415 (1 1:l-9). Paint & Equipment itself was an 
"out of state corporation," as it was based in Yakima, Washington. T. Vol. 111, p. 481 (9:9-12). 
Prior to the purchase, Wesco and Paint & Equipment were of comparable size; Wesco had 14 
stores and P&S had 10. Id. ( 1 0 : -  9 )  None of the record cites provided supports the notion 
that employees were concerned about Paint & Equipment being bought by an "out-of-state" 
corporation. Similarly, the allegation that some employees "were concerned about the treatment 
they were receiving from Wesco's managers," Resp. Br. at 11, goes without any citation to the 
record. The claim that employees had "trouble getting through with phone calls to Wesco's main 
office and concern about communication with the new company" is supported solely by a single 
reference to Mr. Johnston's testimony. R. Vol. IV, p. 602 (126-25). While Respondents claim 
that they "were concerned about Wesco's ability to provide inventory for their customers on a 
timely basis and that Wesco's support was lacking compared to what they had been used to with 
APW," Resp. Br. at 11, the only record citation is to the testimony of Ms. Hancock, who simply 
identified a misunderstanding that led to a two-week gap before Wesco would begin supplying 
the Idaho stores, with the consequence that "we did run out of some things." R. Vol. 111, p. 597 
(40:10:23). There is no proof of any concern about Wesco's long-term ability to service the 
Idaho stores as well as, or better than, APW. 
Finally, Respondents claim that employees were concerned whether they would be laid 
off, particularly in light of Wesco's insistence that they sign an acknowledgment that they were 
employed "at-will." Resp. Br. at 11. "Many of the employees were nervous when they learned 
that they could be fired at any time at Wesco's whim." Id. at 11-12. But, there is no evidence 
that their status as at-will employees changed when Wesco acquired Paint & Equipment, and 
there is simply no support for the claim that employees "were nervous" on account of the form 
each was required to sign. Barkdull found Wesco's principals to be "friendly" and 
"businesslike." R. Vol. 111, p. 470 (69:17-23). There were no threats or discussions about laying 
off staff. Id., p. 469 (67:12-21). 
In short, there is scant to no proof that "the employees each made a personal decision to 
work where they felt most secure." Resp. Br. at 12. As Respondents admit, "[nlone of the 
employees expressed any hatred or serious resentment toward Wesco (until Wesco sued them)." 
Id. 
B. Respondents' Allegation That Wesco Misstates the Record. 
Respondents' claim that Wesco has misstated the record is simply wrong. Wesco will 
address each element of the claim in turn. 
"Ernest and Davis boasted to Wesco Vice President Roger Howe that if they could not 
work out a deal to purchase the Idaho Stores from Paint & Equipment, they would take Paint & 
Equipment's employees. ." Resp. Br. at 13. Apparently, Respondents' only objection to this 
statement is that the term "boasted" is inappropriate; they would prefer the use of "fair warning." 
In context, "boasted" is not an overstatement. Mr. Howe clearly testified that Ernest and Davis 
said "if they couldn't work something out with David [Giussi], they'd just go take it away from 
him." R. Vol. 111, p. 417 (17:4-9). This statement is not "irrelevant," because as demonstrated 
elsewhere in this brief, Ernest, Davis and P&S were not free to "recruit at-will employees" 
without limitation - they could not do so using improper means, or for an improper purpose. See 
infya at 23. 
"At the time of Wesco 'spurchase of the Idaho Stores, Barkdull was Paint & Equipment's 
regional manager ... . Barlidull thus had supewisory responsibility over the Idaho Stores with the 
managers of those stores reporting to him. " Resp. Br. at 13-14. Respondents claim that the 
record was clear that Barkdull was not a "regional manager," just a "sales manager," and had no 
authority over managers. However, in fhe cited record, Barkdull only disclaimed supervisory 
responsibility over counter help and delivery people. R. Vol. 111, p. 435 q/ 2. Moreover, Ernest 
accepted the characterization of Barkdull as the "general manager" of Wesco's stores. R. 01.111, 
pp. 436-37 (19:16-20:2). While Respondents claim that Barkdull's alleged supevisory role is "a 
key element of Wesco's appeal," in fact it is not; as the authorities make clear, Barkdull owed a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to Wesco regardless of his responsibilities. See infra at 18. 
"Barkdull 's brother, defendant Hugh Barkdull, headed outside sales for the Idaho Stores 
at the time Wesco purchased the Idaho Stares. His job duties included malcing shop and sales 
calls to all of the body shops in the area. " Resp. Br. at 14. Respondents complain that Hugh 
Barkdull was the outside salesman for the Pocatello store only, but provide no record citation for 
that proposition. Although Hugh Barkdull worked for Brady Industrial Supply out of Pocatello, 
he ranged far beyond Pocatello, and his duties did not change when Paint & Equipment took 
over. R. Vol. 111, p. 481 (1 1:14-17 (Hugh sold into Idaho Falls)); Id. p. 482 (13:4-6 (job duties 
did not change)). Again, whether Hugh Barkdull had supervisory duties or not is irrelevant. He 
owed a fiduciary duty of loyalty to Wesco. See infra at 18. 
"Over the next few days, Ernest and Davis, on behalf of APW/P&S, formulated a plan to 
steal as many of Wesco's employees in the Eastern Idaho market as possible and recruited 
Barkdull as an ally. ' R e s p .  Br. at 14. Respondents object to the phrase "recruited Barkdull as 
an ally" as unsupported, claiming that "Barkdull would not commit to ErnestiDavis and wanted 
to wait and see what other employees would do." In fact, Barkdull made a much stronger 
commitment than admitted by Respondents. "He was very clear that if in fact the others went he 
would probably go also." R. Vol. 111, p. 442 (25: 11-12). Barkdull "made it clear to [Ernest] that 
if [Ernest] were able to solicit these other employees he'd go with [P&S]." Id. (25:16-18). 
Ernest and Davis approached Barkdull first, obtaining his consent to the arrangement. 
"While Barkdull was still a Wesco employee, Barkdull, Ernest, and Davis worked 
together to carry out theirplan. " Resp. Br. at 15. Respondents claim that Barkdull was not "in 
on a plan to hire other employees" - the plan was "solely that of Ernest and Davis." Id. To 
begin with, the statement is not limited to the recruiting of Wesco employees, and the evidence is 
uncontradicted that Barkdull was a part of the effort to locate store sites for P&S - including 
making phone calls to local realtors and governments. As for the recruiting of employees, 
Barkdull had "made it clear to [Ernest] that if [Emest] were able to solicit these other employees 
he'd go with [P&S]." R. Vol. 111, p. 442 (25:16-18). Barkdull thereby knew of, acquiesced in 
and ratified Ernest and Davis's recruitment of Wesco's employees, and it is beyond dispute that 
he attended the dinner at which Ernest and Davis recruited Ms. Hancock. 
"On August 13, 2005, Barkdull met with Ernest to scout out potential store sites for 
P&S/APW. " Resp. Br. at 15. Respondents do not deny that Barkdull was with Ernest when 
Ernest was scouting out potential store sites, but claim that Barkdull "made a job offer to 
Barkdull while Barkdull was 'riding along' with him." Id. Significantly, the job offer came 
much earlier. According to Davis, he and Emest offered Barkdull a job at the Tremonton 
meeting, before the site tour occurred. R. Vol. 111, pp. 458-59 (18:13 - 19:6). Moreover, that 
Barkdull was "coincidentally" along for the ride does not square with the fact that Barkdull, 
allegedly before he made the decision to join P&S, made numerous calls to realtors, title 
companies and government offices about potential sites for P&S/APW. R. Vol. 11, p. 191; 
R. Vol. 111, pp. 546-48. Nowhere has Barkdull claimed that he was seeking locations for a 
business he himself would set up; he was clearly aiding a known competitor of his employer, 
Wesco, and thereby breached his duty of loyalty. 
"In fact, Barkdull and Ernest delivered a letter to a Wesco customer prior to August 19, 
2005, that identijed Barkdull as an employee of P&S; the letter was dated August 16, 2005, 
three days prior to the effective date ofBarldull's resignation. " Resp. Br. at 16. The letter 
exists and is dated August 16,2005. R. Vol. V, p. 906. While the Wesco customer who received 
this letter was uncertain as to the day he received it, such testimony does nothing to negate the 
possibility that the letter means what it says - that as of August 16, 2005, Brady Barkdull was a 
member of the P&S team and represented as such. A jury would be free to discredit the 
testimony of Cory Hansen, who as an employee of P&S has a clear bias, that Barkdull's name 
was added sometime after August 22 despite the date shown on the letter. 
"Shortly aJler scouting locations, Barkdull, Ernest, and Davis then began recruiting 
Wesco 's employees. They started with the managers. " Resp. Br. at 16. Respondents claim that 
this statement misstates the record by including Barkdull. While it is true that Respondents 
claim that Ernest and Davis were the ones who made offers to Wesco's employees, as noted 
previously, Barkdull, by his "nudge nudge, wink wink" agreement with Ernest and Davis, in 
which he "made it clear to [Ernest] that if [Ernest] were able to solicit these other employees 
he'd go with [P&S]," R. Vol. 111, p. 442 (25:16-18), acquiesced in and ratified their conduct. 
You can "recruit" a co-worker without actually being the one making the offer - e.g., by telling 
the co-worker that it is likely (or certain) that you will join the new employer as well. It is 
undisputed that Barkdull attended the dinner at which Ms. Hancock was offered a job, and the 
record does not negate discussions between Barkdull and the other employees. Wesco's trial 
counsel did not ask the departing employees whether Ernest and Davis told them that Barkdull 
would join P&S as well. At the same time, no witness testified that they were not so advised. 
"On August 17, 2005, Howe and Wesco employee Mark Mortensen met in Pocatello to 
discuss rumors that employees would be leaving en masse and starting worlcfor a competitor. 
Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull, and Cook attended the meeting. All three lied to Wesco (Howe and 
Mortensen) and assured them there was no substance to the rumors." Resp. Br. at 17. The cited 
testimony supports the statement in full. Howe testified that he confronted Barkdull, Hugh 
Barkdull, and Cook about rumors that those three were "'going off and competing against me 
and maybe getting together with Holly [ErnesE] and stuff."' R. Vol. 111, p. 419 (42:24-44:2) 
(emphasis added). Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull, and Cook denied any such intent. Id. Although 
Respondents claim that Hugh Barkdull and Cook had not yet received job offers from Ernest, 
they admit that such offers were made the same day. Resp. Br. at 4. 
"Barkdull discussed with Peck and Dayley their resignations." Resp. Br. at 18. 
Respondents complain that any discussions between Barkdull and Peck and Dayley about their 
resignations occuned after Peck and Dayley had decided to resign. In fact, the challenged 
statement makes no claim to the contrary. What is undisputed is that Barkdull discussed those 
resignations with Peck and Dayley before Peck and Dayley faxed their resignations to Wesco. 
R. Vol. 111, p. 472 (79:lO-15; 80:16-24). 
"With their departure from Wesco, the employees stole Wesco proprietary customer 
information, computers, paint chip books, Jiles, and Rolodexes. " Resp. Br. at 18. This statement 
is supported by the testimony of Craig Rossum. Although Mr. Rossum was not present in the 
stores at the time the employees quit en masse, he testified as to what records ordinarily would 
be present - ordering history, customer formulas, and the like. When he examined what was left, 
he testified that those records were missing. R. Vol. 111, p. 514 (93:ll-94:9). It is certainly 
within the realm of permissible inference, based upon Mr. Rossum's testimony, that such records 
were taken. Wesco's forensic expert testified that Cook's Pocatello computer had customer files 
that had been copied or deleted. R. Vol. 11, pp. 309-1 1, q/¶ 13-14, 20. And, the claim that "[all1 
of Wesco's important data was stored on a central computer in Washington, not on Cook's 
computer," Resp. Br. at 21, is simply unsupported by any citation to the record. 
In short, because of the mass defection, Wesco was put at a significant disadvantage; its 
evidence of theft is necessarily circumstantial. It is nonetheless substantial evidence to which all 
favorable inferences must be given on summary judgment. It is not sufficient to rebut this 
inference for Respondents to say, in effect, "trust us, we didn't take anything important." 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Dismissal of Wesco's Claims was Error Because Wesco Presented 
Abundant Circumstantial Evidence of Respondents' Wrongdoing. 
I .  Circumstantial Evidence Is Sufficient to Withstand Summary 
Judgment. 
Both the trial court and this Court must liberally construe all disputed facts and draw all 
reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of Wesco, as the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax 
Comrn'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006) (citing Infanger v. City ofSalmon, 137 
Idaho 45,47,44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002)). 
It is not surprising in this case that the former Wesco employees, all named as defendants 
below, largely did not directly admit wrongdoing when deposed, and their self-sewing 
declarations are a testament to good lawyering. It has never been the case, however, that a trier 
of fact must limit itself to admissions of guilt or like direct evidence; circumstantial evidence is 
legally sufficient to sustain a claim. Indeed, the law makes no distinction between direct and 
circumstantial evidence: 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction 
between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable 
method of proof and each is respected for such convincing force as it may carry. 
IDJI 2d 1.24.1; see also Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 
Idaho 11 7, 206 P.3d 481, 487 (2009) (circumstantial evidence sufficient to defeat motion for 
summary judgment). Ignoring Respondents' protestations of innocence, as this Court must on 
summary judgment, there is substantial circumstantial evidence of actionable wrongdoing by 
Respondents here. 
Antitrust law provides a useful analogy. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof of a 
"contract, combination ... or conspiracy" between separate entities; it does not reach wholly 
unilateral action. I ABA ANTITRUST LAW SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 3 (6th ed. 
2007) ("ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS"); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 
U.S. 752, 76-68 (1984); 15 U.S.C. 5 1. A formal contract is not necessary to establish the 
element of concerted action. An agreement may be "a unity of purpose or a common design and 
understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement." American Tabacco Co. v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946). Concerted action may arise even without verbal 
communication; "[a] knowing wink can mean more than words." Esco Corp. v. United States, 
340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965). Concerted action may be found even if the parties 
themselves deny reaching agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1332 (4th 
Cir. 1979). 
Direct evidence of a conspiracy or concerted action under the Sherman Act is rare. "Only 
rarely will there be direct evidence of an express agreement" in conspiracy cases. Local Union 
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,720 (1965). Consequently, 
concerted action is frequently proved by circumstantial evidence, which can be dispositive. 
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 5-17. Antitrust plaintiffs most commonly have tried to 
demonstrate the required concerted action by proof of "conscious parallelism" - a pattern of 
uniform business conduct. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222-23 
(1939). Today, although conscious parallelism standing alone is not sufficient to support a 
finding of concerted action, an antitrust plaintiff may establish the element by proof of so-called 
"plus factors" - factors that tend to negate independent action. See ANTITRUST LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS 11. The opportunity for collusion, especially when combined with proof of 
actual communication and simultaneous, identical action following such communication, is one 
such "plus factor." See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 368-69 (3d Cir. 
Idaho law regarding proof of conspiracy is perfectly in accord with federal antitrust law. 
No formal or express "agreement" is required, and a conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial 
evidence: 
It is important to note that an agreement that is the foundation of a conspiracy 
charge need not be formal or express, and the evidence of the agreement need not 
be direct. [State v. Lopez, 140 Idaho 197, 199, 90 P.3d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 
2004)l. Rather, the agreement may be inferred from the circumstances and 
proven by circumstantial evidence. Id.; State v. Martin, 113 Idaho 461, 466, 745 
P.2d 1082,1087 (Ct. App. 1987). 
State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684,201 P.3d 657 (Idaho App. 2008). 
Although this discussion is applicable generally to the permissible inferences from the 
evidence adduced by Wesco, it is particularly pertinent to Wesco's claims of an agreement 
among at least Barkdull, Ernest, Davis, and P&S to solicit an abrupt, en masse departure of 
Wesco employees specifically to harm Wesco. Here, there is direct evidence that Barkdull 
"made it clear to [Ernest] that if [Ernest] were able to solicit these other employees he'd go with 
[P&S]." R. Vol. 111, p. 442 (25:16-18). It is reasonable to assume that Barkdull would go with 
P&S only if Ernest and Davis could assure Barkdull, by soliciting sufficient numbers of Wesco's 
employees, that Wesco would not be a competitive threat to P&S. Ernest and Davis concluded 
that they needed to move quickly, while Wesco was still vulnerable, Resp. Br. at 10, and "[plart 
of their strategy was to approach the key employees of Wesco's new stores and offer them jobs." 
Id. In other words, Ernest and Davis acted with the purpose of harming Wesco - to keep it from 
being "as well prepared as it needed to be." Id. Wesco's departing employees knew in fact or 
should have known that a mass defection would have a "fairly negative impact on Wesco's 
ability to continue in operation." R. Vol. 111, p. 497 (37:25-385). 
2. At-Will Employees Breach Their Duty of Loyalty by (a) Recruiting 
Other At-Will Employees to Leave for a Competitor; and (b) by 
Abrupt& Resigning En Massc for a Competitor, Leaviicg Their 
Employer in the Lurch. 
In essence, Respondents argue that an at-will employee has an unlimited right to prepare 
to compete with his or her employer, relying on genera1 principles that society is generally best 
served by encouraging competition. But, Respondents cite no authority for this remarkable 
proposition. To the contrary, the law recognizes a competing value - the integrity of the 
relationship between employer and employee, between principal and agent - that acts to limit the 
permissible actions of even an at-will employee: 
We agree that, prior to resignation, these defendants were entitled to make 
arrangements to resign, including plans to compete with their employer, and that 
such conduct would not ordinarily result in liability for breach of fiduciary duty. 
However, the right to make such arrangements is not absolute. This right, based 
on a policy of free competition, must be balanced with the importance of the 
integrity and fairness attaching to the relationship between employer and 
employee or corporation and corporate director. Science Accessories Coup. v. 
Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 962-63 (Del. 1980); Maryland Metals, Inc. 
v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (1978). Under certain circumstances, 
the exercise of the right may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Restatement 
(Second) of Agency 5 393 cmt. 1 (1957). 
Feddeman & Co., C.P.A., P.C. v. Langan Assocs., P.C., 530 S.E.2d 668,672 (Va. 2000). 
Respondents incorrectly argue that RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF AGENCY ("THIRD 
RESTATEMENT") 5 8.04 (2006) adopts changes that favor them. A thorough reading of the 
commentary demonstrates clearly that the THIRD RESTATEMENT does not reject the twin 
arguments made by Wesco: (a) that Brady Barkdull's solicitation of Wesco employees; and (h) 
the abrupt departure of those employees, with or without solicitation, breached their duties of 
loyalty to Wesco, and Ernest, Davis, and P&S's interference with the at-will employment 
relationship was there wrongful. 
Section 8.04 of the THIRD RESTATEMENT states: 
Throughout the duration of an agency relationship, an agent has a duty to refrain 
from competing with the principal and from taking action on behalf of or 
otherwise assisting the principal's competitors. During that time, an agent may 
take action, not otherwise wrongful, to prepare for competition following 
termination of the agency relationship. 
THIRD RESTATEMENT 5 8.04 (2006). The last sentence - relating to preparations to compete - 
simply does not give Respondents the free rein they claim, either to solicit other employees or to 
quit en masse. The ensuing comments and Reporter's Notes make it abundantly clear that the 
authors of the THIRD RESTATEMENT would characterize solicitation of employees or an en masse 
resignation as a breach of an employee's duty of toyalty. 
"[Tlhe tactics that an agent may use in competing or preparing to compete are subject to 
legal limits." THIRD RESTATEMENT 5 8.04 cmt. b at 303 (2006). Nowhere does the THIRD 
RESTATEMENT excuse the recruiting of other employees to join in the new competing endeavor, 
and "actions of individual and soon-to-be-former agents may become wrongful when they 
constitute concerted action designed with the purpose of leaving the principal in the lurch." Id. 
Moreover, restrictions on an employee's preparation and recruitment of others does not depend 
upon the position that the employee holds in the organization. "[Tlhe rules stated in this section 
are applicable regardless of the nature of an agent's duties or position or the relative status that 
an agent or other employee occupies within an organization." Id. Accordingly, it is irrelevant 
whether Brady Barkdull was a supervisory employee or not; it is irrelevant whether Hugh 
Barkdull was manager of outside sales for one or all three stores. The same rules apply. 
The THIRD RESTATEMENT recognizes that an agent "has a duty not to mislead the 
principal about the agent's intentions." Id. ant. c at 306. 
An agent's silence may mislead the principal when, for example, the agent knows 
that the principal is about to embark on an expansion in the principal's business in 
which the agent will play a crucial role that will not easily be replicated once the 
agent departs. 
Id. On August 17, 2005, when Howe and Mortensen met in Pocatello to discuss rumors that 
employees would be leaving to work with Ernest and Davis, R. Vol. I, p. 12,130; R. Vol. 111, p. 
419 (42:17-44:8), Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull, and Cook denied any such intention. As the timeline 
makes clear, whether or not Barkdull had accepted employment with Ernest and Davis by that 
date, he had at least been actively courted, allegedly telling Ernest and Davis that his decision 
would depend upon what other employees decided. Under the circumstances, Barkdull at least 
had a duty to Wesco to disclose this fact on August 17,2005. 
Finally, the THIRD RESTATEMENT recognizes the devastating consequences of an 
employee's ability to assess the contributions other employees might make to a new endeavor 
and the competitive injury a well-timed mass departure would inflict: 
An employee ... who works with a wide range of colleagues ... has an 
opportunity to assess their skills and motivation and potential contributions to a 
new or existing competitive venture from a vantage point that is inaccessible 
outside the employer's organization. Employees may be able to time their 
departures so that maximum competitive injury is inflicted on the employer 
because their knowledge of the employer's vulnerabilities at particular times is 
especially acute, enabling employees who make a concerted plan to depart to time 
their departure en masse so as to enhance the injury inflicted on the principal. 
Id. 
The THIRD RESTATEMENT clearly recognizes than an abrupt, en masse resignation to join 
a competitor is wrongful. All of the cases cited in the Reporter's notes support this conclusion, 
and no case is cited for the proposition that an abrupt, en masse resignation is not actionable. 
See, e.g., Duane Jones & Co. v. Burke, 117 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1954) (an advertising firm's 
officers and employees planned a departure en masse without any warning to the firm's majority 
shareholders and chairman, inviting clients to follow was actionable); Feddeman & Co., C.P.A., 
P.C. v. Langan Assocs., P.C., 530 S.E.2d 668, 673 (Va. 2000) (directors and employees of an 
accounting firm who planned a mass walkout if the firm's major shareholder rejected their 
buyout offer, knowing that the walkout would be devastating to the firm was actionable). 
Respondents' efforts to distinguish Alexander &Alexander Benejts Sews., Inc. v. Benejt 
Brokers & Consultants, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1408, 1415 (D. Or. 1991), are unavailing. First, while 
it is true that Alexander is not an Idaho case, Respondents cite no Idaho authority conflicting 
with the case's basic premise - that soliciting the departure of an at-will employee and an en 
masse departure both violate an employee's fiduciary duty. Second, although Alexander relied 
upon the SECOND RESTATEMENT 5 393 cmt. e (1958), the ruling did not go "against strong legal 
precedent establishing an employee's right to make preparations to compete." To the contrary, 
all of the authorities cited to this Court find liability in the case of an en masse departure, and the 
THIRD RESTATEMENT continues to recognize and expand upon the rule. Third, the fact that in 
Alexander the departedisoliciting employee had "ownership" in the competing husiness is of no 
moment. Neither the SECOND RESTATEMENT nor the THIRD RESTATEMENT recognize any 
distinction between cases in which a departing employee has ownership of the competing 
business and those in which he or she does not. In fact, in Alexander, only the first-named 
defendant - Donald Econe - had an ownership interest in the competing business, while the other 
individual defendants left and became merely employees of Econe's new business, yet all of 
them were en jo i~ed .~  Finally, as discussed below, Wesco submitted evidence that Barkdull, 
Ernest, Davis, and their company, P&S, were in fact involved in soliciting and encouraging 
Wesco's employees to depart abruptly en masse for the purpose of destroying Wesco's ability to 
complete - certainly enough to withstand summary judgment - and that Barkdull and other 
Wesco employees facilitated and even encouraged that solicitation. 
Respondents' efforts to distinguish R Homes Corp. v. Herr, 142 Idaho 87, 123 P.3d 720 
(Ct. App. 2005), are equally unavailing. In R Homes, the trial court struck the only evidence of 
"solicitation" submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, leaving no evidence of 
solicitation whatsoever. Here, there is ample evidence in the record of such solicitation and of 
agreement by Wesco's employees that they would leave en masse at a crucial stage of Wesco's 
In Twin Falls Farm & City Dist'g, Inc. v. D & B Supply Co., Inc., 96 Idaho 351,528 P.2d 1286 
(1974), App. Br. at 16, an employee breached his fiduciary duty when he negotiated with other 
employees to hire them away to competitor for which he had arranged or was arranging his own 
employment; there was no indication that the employee held an ownership interest in the 
competitor. Similarly, in Duane Jones & Co. v. Burke, 117 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1954), at least one 
departing employee was held liable despite the fact that he had no ownership interest in the 
competing entity. And in Feddeman & Co., C.P.A., P.C. v. Langan Assocs., P.C., 530 S.E.2d 
668, 673 (Va. 2000), employees who left to become mere employees of the competing entity 
were found liable. 
business. For the same reasons, Gresham & Assocs., Inc. v. Strianese, 595 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2004), supports Wesco's position. 
Oddly, Respondents accuse Wesco of relying upon the case of R.G. Nelson, A.I.A. v. 
Steer, I18 Idaho 409, 412, 797 P.2d 117, 120 (1990), for the proposition that employees owe 
their employer "absolute fidelity" - charging that this phrase is nowhere to be found in R.G. 
Nelson. But, Wesco does not cite to R.G. Nelson at all. Instead, Wesco relies upon the 
statements of this Court in Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348, 353, 210 P. 
1003 (1922), quoted at length in Wesco's opening brief. App. Br. at 15. There, this Court itself 
used words like "loyalty," "fidelity," and "fiduciary," concluding that "[tlhe law guards the 
fiduciary relationship, which the relationship of principal and agent is, with jealous care. It seeks 
to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and personal interest. It demands that 
forbids him Erom acting adversely to his principal, either for himself or others." It is hard to 
imagine a stronger statement of the duties of an employee to his or her employer. To suggest 
that imposing fiduciary duties of loyalty and fidelity on at-will employees somehow constitutes 
them as "indentured servants" is ludicrous. 
The facts supporting this claim - for breach of loyalty - are clearly present. There was an 
agreement among at least Barkdull, Ernest, Davis, and P&S to solicit an abrupt, en masse 
departure of Wesco employees specifically to harm Wesco. Barkdull "made it clear to [Ernest] 
that if [Ernest] were able to solicit these other employees he'd go with [P&S]." R. Vol. 111, p. 
442 (25:16-18). Ernest and Davis intended to harm Wesco at a time when it was most 
vulnerable, and Wesco's departing employees knew or should have known that a mass defection 
would have a "fairly negative impact on Wesco's ability to continue in operation." R. Vol. 111, p. 
497 (37:25-38:5). Accordingly, dismissla of this claim was in error. 
3. Ernest, Davis, and P&S Are Directly Liable for Tortiously Interfering 
with Wesco's Employment Contracts with its Employees. 
It is clear that, until terminated, a contract terminable at-will is valid and subsisting, and 
may not be interfered with. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, cmt. g (1979).~ Certainly 
Respondents cite no authority, in Idaho or elsewhere, for a contrary proposition. Accordingly, 
the relationship between Wesco and its employees was one with which Ernest, Davis, and P&S 
could tortiously interfere, assuming the balance of the elements of the tort are proved. 
The question in this case is whether Ernest, Davis, and P&S employed "wrongful means" 
or had an "improper purpose" in soliciting the mass defection of Wesco employees, whether or 
not Barkdull or other Wesco employees participated at the direction of Ernest, Davis, and P&S. 
First, Idaho law requires that "the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of 
interference itself (is. that the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper 
means)." Highland Enters., Znc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999). 
Second, under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 768(1) (1979), "competition" is not a 
defense to a claim for tortious interference if the actor employs "wrongful means." 
In its opening brief, Wesco argued two sources of wrongful means/improper purpose. 
First, Wesco argued that Ernest, Davis, and P&S has actively participated in (aided and abetted) 
Wesco employees' breach of their duty of loyalty by hiring all of Wesco's employees - the 
breach of loyalty being the Wesco employees' abrupt, en masse resignation - leaving Wesco 
Of further note, when a person knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust he 
himself is guilty of tortious conduct and is subject to liability for the harm thereby caused. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 874, cmt. c (1976). 
with no employees with experience in the market to compete with P&s.~ App. Br. at 18-19. 
Second, Wesco argued that Ernest, Davis, and P&S also participated other breaches of the duty 
of loyalty - specifically, using Barkdull and other management employees to solicit all of 
Wesco's employees to join P&S. 
Wesco has discussed the liability of employees for an en masse resignation above. That 
liability is clear. It is also clear that Ernest, Davis, and P&S are liable for soliciting the departure 
of all of Wesco's employees, thereby substantially injuring Wesco's ability to compete. In 
Alexander & Alexander Benefits Sews., Inc. v. Benefit Brokers & Consultants, Inc., 756 F .  Supp. 
1408, 1415 (D. Or. 1991), the Court held that a claim for tortious interference with business 
relationships could be maintained against the competitor where former employees had solicited 
their fellow employees to leave employment and work for the competitor. The Court held that 
the competitor could be liable for the conduct of its new employees if the competitor knowingly 
participated in, encouraged, and accepted the benefits of the acts of unfair competition. Id. at 
1412. 
Respondents continually complain that in this case Wesco sought to destroy competition in the 
marketplace, and to establish itself as a monopolist. Resp. Br. at 30. That complaint is 
laughable; the shoe in fact is on the other foot. Before Wesco's purchase of the Idaho stores, 
there was one supplier at this level of distribution - Paint & Equipment. After Wesco's 
purchase, there was again one supplier - Wesco. Before Wesco's purchase, Ernest claimed that 
P&S had the ability to compete in the three Idaho cities in which Paint & Equipment's stores 
were located. After Wesco's purchase, Ernest, Davis, and P&S in fact eliminated Wesco, the 
one entity capable of competing with P&S in these markets, by hiring away all of its employees, 
with the result that P&S acquired virtually all of Wesco's customers - and depriving Wesco of 
the benefit of the $2.2 million it spent in acquiring the Idaho stores. 
Alexander is certainly not the only case holding that a competitor may be held liable for 
hiring away at-will employees in a mass defection - the United States Supreme Court has held as 
much. 
Certainly, if a competing trader should endeavor to draw customers from his rival, 
not by offering better or cheaper goods, employing more competent salesmen, or 
displaying more attractive advertisements, but by persuading the rival's clerks to 
desert him under circumstances rendering it difficult or embarrassing for him to 
fill their places, any court of equity would grant an injunction to restrain this as 
unfair competition. 
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229,259 (1917). See also Architectural 
Mfg. Co. of America v. Airotec, Inc., 166 S.E.2d 744 (Ga. App. 1969) (the Georgia Court of 
Appeals reversed a directed verdict in favor of the competitor where the competitor had induced 
a substantial part of the plaintiffs at-will sales force to resign and join the competing firm); 
Bancroft- Whitney Co. v Glen, 64 Cal.2d 327, 49 Cal. Rptr. 825, 4 1 1 P.2d 92 1 (1 966) (one of the 
defendants had violated his fiduciary duties to the plaintiff, a publisher of lawbooks, and the 
other defendants, competitors of the plaintiff, having cooperated in and reaped the fruits of his 
violation, were guilty of unfair competition). 
It may be actionable to hire away employees, even if they are not bound by a 
contract or if the contract is terminable at will, when the defendant's primary 
motivation is not merely to obtain skilled employees, but to impair or disable a 
competitive business or to obtain access to a rival's trade secrets. One example is 
of such conduct is systematic inducement of multiple employees of a single 
organization; in such a case, the defendant does not seek the services of gifted or 
skilled employees as such, but aims to cripple, destroy or misappropriate a 
competitor's business organization. 
LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES 5 9.21 (4th ed. 2009) (footnotes omitted). 
Respondents do not contest the pertinent facts or inferences to be drawn from them. As 
noted in Wesco's opening brief, it may readily be inferred from the facts presented that Ernest, 
Davis, and P&S as well as the other defendants had an improper purpose and used wrongful 
means to cause injury to Wesco's prospective economic advantage. Just as the employees in 
Alexander left their employment in a coordinated manner, leaving their former employer without 
staff in a particular office, the defendant employees, Ernest, Davis, and P&S left Wesco without 
managers or trained sales staff in the Eastern Idaho market. And, like the competitor in 
Alexander, Ernest, Davis, and P&S participated in, encouraged, and benefited from former 
Wesco employees' wrongful acts - specifically, the abrupt resignation of the entire workforce 
without notice. 
Likewise, that Ernest, Davis, and P&S had an improper purpose not just to compete with, 
but to destroy, Wesco's Eastern Idaho operations is readily inferred from the facts in evidence. 
Upon learning of Wesco's acquisition, those defendants formulated a plan to take as many of 
Wesco's employees in the market as possible. R. Vol. 111, p. 460 (20:18-23). Ernest, Davis, and 
P&S told Wesco's Roger Howe months earlier that they knew the Paint & Equipment employees 
and had a better relationship with them than Paint & Equipment's owner had. R. Vol. 111, pp. 
41 6-1 7 (1 5: 14-17: 19). They also knew that Wesco had just purchased the Idaho stores and that 
its presence in the Eastern Idaho market was brand new. R. Vol. 111, p. 471 (73:19-74:20). It can 
easily be inferred that defendants knew Wesco would be particularly vulnerable in the early 
going, as Wesco would be entirely dependent on its newly-acquired management and sales staff 
to maintain continuity through the transition. They also knew it would be very difficult, if not 
impossible, for Wesco to continue to operate the Idaho stores if all of its employees abruptly left 
en masse. R. Vol. 111, pp. 447-49 (36:5-38:15). They did not seek to compete with Wesco; they 
sought to eliminate Wesco from the Eastern Idaho market. R. Vol. 111, pp. 465 (25:6-16), 466 
(34:7-15). 
In short, there is ample evidence that Ernest, Davis, and P&S also used wrongful means 
to cause injury to Wesco. By aiding and abetting Barkdull and other Wesco managers in 
breaching their duty of loyalty by soliciting Wesco employees while still employed by Wesco, 
Ernest, Davis, and P&S used wrongful means to achieve their wrongful ends. 
Barkdull, while still employed by Wesco as a regional manager, along with Ernest 
recruited Jenny Hancock to work for P&S. R. Vol. 111, pp. 494 (23:5-25), 443-44 (31:9-32:24). 
Barkdull and Ernest then used Hancock to recruit other Idaho Falls employees. R. Vol. 111, pp. 
494 (22:14-23:25); 500 (6:17-7:12); 503 (6:21-7:4). Similarly, Ernest, Davis, and P&S used 
Mike Cook to recruit Pocatello employees. Id. pp. 505 (6:17-9:22); 508 (6:16-7:18); 510-11 
(7:19-9%). Ernest, Davis, and P&S used the management of the Idaho stores, in breach of their 
duty of loyalty, to recruit an entire workforce in the Eastern Idaho market. 
There is ample evidence of both wrollgful means and wrongfix1 purpose; therefore, the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment on this claim. 
4. Ernest, Davis, a~nd P&S Are Liable for Tortiously Interfering with 
Wesco's Contracts with its Employees. 
Oddly, Respondents fail to address Wesco's argument that the trial court improperly 
dismissed its claim that Ernest, Davis, and P&S were liable for tortiously interfering with 
Wesco's employment contracts. For this reason alone, this Court should reverse and remand for 
trial. 
As noted in Wesco's opening brief, Ernest, Davis, and P&S moved to dismiss Wesco's 
claims for interference with Wesco's employment contracts arguing that "there is no evidence of 
any employment contract." But as Wesco demonstrated, the entire employment relationship is 
based on contract, express or implied. App. Br. at 22. Instead, the trial court found that the 
Wesco employees had not breached tl~eir'contracts; second, the trial court held that Ernest, 
Davis, and P&S could not be liable because the contracts were terminable at-will. R. Vol. IV, 
pp. 721-22. 
But as demonstrated in Wesco's opening brief, the fact that the employment contracts 
were terminable at-will does not defeat the claim, and employees need not "breach" their 
employment contracts for the action to lie. App. Br. at 22-23. Finally, as demonstrated above, 
see supra at 22-23, Ernest, Davis, and P&S employed wrongll means for a wrongful purpose - 
inducing a breach of the duty of loyalty for the purpose of destroring Wesco's ability to 
compete. Even if this Court excuses Respondents' failure to argue this claim, genuine issues of 
fact exist requiring a trial. 
5. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Wesco's Claims for Tortious 
Interference with Wesco's Customer Contracts. 
Respondents also fail to address Wesco's argument that the trial court improperly 
dismissed its claim that Ernest, Davis, P&S, and the employee defendants were liable for 
tortiously interfering with Wesco's customer contracts. Again, for this reason alone, this Court 
should reverse and remand for trial. 
The trial court's sole reason for dismissing Wesco's claim was that Wesco's customer 
contracts were allegedly terminable at-will. R. Vol. IV, pp. 723-24. As noted in Wesco's 
opening brief, App. Br. at 24, dismissal of this claim on this ground was improper. The fact that 
any contract is terminable at-will simply does not defeat the claim. The trial court's dismissal 
cannot be sustained on the ground that Respondents were privileged to interfere; as the record 
abundantly demonstrates, Ernest, Davis, and P&S interfered with Wesco's contracts by inducing 
an abrupt, en masse departure of its employees (a breach of their duty of loyalty), depriving 
Wesco of the means to service its customers. These acts were done using wronghl means and 
for an improper purpose - crippling Wesco at a time when it was most vulnerable. Even if this 
Court excuses Respondents' failure to argue this claim, genuine issues of fact exist requiring a 
trial. 
6. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Wesco's ITSA Claim. 
Wesco alleged that defendants misappropriated trade secrets such as customer lists, lists 
showing customer buying preferences, the history of customer purchases, and custom paint 
formulas. The trial court, while it recognized that such information would constitute trade 
secrets, dismissed all of Wesco's ITSA claims except those against Mr. Cook. It clearly erred in 
dismissing Wesco's claims against the other defendants. Through the testimony of Craig 
Rossum, Wesco established that that files containing the history of customer purchases and 
custom paint formulas likely were removed from Wesco's Idaho stores at the time of the mass 
defection. In short, files that should have been there were not. R. Vol. 111, pp. 514-17 (93:4 - 
108:15). That evidence gave rise to a genuine issue of material fact, and the trial court erred in 
dismissing for the reasons stated in Wesco's opening brief. App. Br. at 25-28. 
Again, Respondents fail to address Wesco's argument; consequently, for this reason 
alone, this Court should reverse and remand for trial. 
7. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Wesco's Conspiracy Claim. 
The trial court dismissed Wesco's claims for civil conspiracy because it could find no 
evidence of an "agreement" to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawhl 
objective in an unlawful manner. R. Vol. IV, pp. 733. As noted above, whether or not the Court 
is inclined to consider federal antitrust law as a guide, it is clear under Idaho law an "agreement" 
need not be express and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The trial court erred in 
failing to consider the agreement among Barkdull, Ernest, Davis, and P&S that Barkdull would 
join P&S if Ernest and Davis succeeded in hiring away sufficient numbers of Wesco's 
employees. At the very least, there is a triable issue as to the existence of such an agreement. 
There is also a triable issue as to the purpose of that agreement. As noted elsewhere, 
Wesco presented, and Respondents have admitted, facts from which a plausible inference may be 
drawn that the purpose of the agreement was wrongful - to cripple Wesco's ability to compete. 
There is also a triable issue as to whether the means employed were wrongful. As Wesco has 
argued at length, the employee defendants breached their duty of loyalty to Wesco by abruptly 
resigning en masse, leaving Wesco in the lurch and with no means to compete. And, certain 
employee defendants more directly breached their duty of loyalty by recruiting other Wesco 
employees to defect. Those means are wrongful and actionable. At the very least, it is for a jury 
to decide, and this Court should reverse and remand for trial. 
B. Respondents' Cross-Appeal: The Trial Court Correctly Denied Summary 
Judgment as to the Balance of Wesco's Claims. 
In its September 7, 2006, order, the trial court properly denied summary judgment as to 
certain claims. Specifically, the trial court preserved the following claims: 
Breach of the Duty of Loyalty (Count I). Only claims against Barkdull and Cook 
survive. 
Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Count II). Only claims against 
Barkdull and Cook survive. 
Unfair Competition (Count V). Only claims against Barkdull, Cook, and P&S survive. 
Computer Fraud Abuse Act (Count VII). The trial court refused to dismiss this count 
against Cook, as it found "undisputed evidence" that Cook had deleted information from the 
Wesco computer. Id., p. 728. 
Idaho Trade Secrets Act (Count VIII). Finding a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether Cook's actions in copying files on his computer violated the Act. Id., p. 730. 
Conversion (Count X). The trial court denied summary judgment as to Cook, Johnston, 
and Cristobal. Id., p. 733. Wesco voluntarily dismissed claims against Johnston and Cristobal; 
consequently, the claim survives only as to Cook. 
I. There Are Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluding Summary 
Dismissal of Claims for Breach of the Duty of Loyalty Against 
Barkdull and Cook. 
Respondents argue that claims for breach of the duty of loyalty against Barkdull and 
Cook should be summarily dismissed for two reasons, neither of which withstands scrutiny. 
First, Respondents repeat the same argument made in response to Wesco's appeal: namely, that 
the Respondents were merely engaged in permissible "preparations" to compete and that 
Barkdull and Cook did not "recruit" other Wesco employees to leave. That argument fails for 
the reasons stated previously. In sum, there is both direct and circumstantial evidence that 
Barkdull in particular agreed with Ernest, Davis, and S&P to induce Wesco's employees to 
resign abruptly, en masse, in such a manner as to leave Wesco incapable of competing against 
S&P, when he told Davis that he would join S&P if the other employees of Wesco did so as well. 
This was a breach of the duty of loyalty, as was Barkdull's misleading statement to Roger Howe, 
when confronted, that he had no intent to leave Wesco and join Ernest and Davis. Barkdull had a 
duty to speak, and had he done so Wesco could have taken action to persuade its employees to 
stay or otherwise mitigate the impact of the defection. Instead, Wesco learned that it had been 
misled only when it received the resignation letters of virtually its entire Idaho workforce after 
the close of business on Friday, August 19,2005. Barkdull instructed the departing employees to 
tender their resignations en masse at the close of business on that Friday. R. Vol. 111, p. 497 
(39:15 - 40:7). This evidence raises at least a triable issue. Cook admitted that on Friday, 
August 19, he announced his plan to resign to two other employees, who decided to quit as well. 
He then provided a form resignation letter to those employees, who used the form in tendering 
their resignations. 
Second, Respondents claim that Wesco cannot prove that any of the alleged breaches 
caused Wesco harm, misstating Idaho law on causation and damages and ignoring the 
unchallenged testimony of Wesco's expert that the wrongfbl acts of Respondents had caused 
Wesco substantial harm. This argument is new to the discussion, and requires more attention 
here. 
The Respondents claim that breach of a fiduciary duty is "arguably" a contract action. 
Resp. Br. at 35. By characterizing the action as one grounded in contract, Respondents 
apparently hope to gain the benefit of an alleged stricter rule in contract that would require 
Wesco to prove with "reasonable certainty" a causal link between the breach and the damages 
claimed. However, the law is clear that a breach of fiduciary duties, including the duty of 
loyalty, gives rise to a claim in tort. "A fiduciary who commits a breach of his duty as a 
fiduciary is guilty of tortious conduct to the person for whoin he should act." RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS 5 874 (1979) (emphasis added). An agent's breach of the fiduciary duties 
owed to his or her principal is a claim based in tort law. See Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 
637, 646, 39 P.3d 577, 586 (2001). Damages flowing from the breach of fiduciary duty are tort 
damages. Id. 
Where, as here, the action lies in tort, Wesco may prove causation by simply showing 
that, more prohably than not, the tortious 'act was a "substantial factor" in "bringing about the 
injury." To begin with, a tort plaintiff must establish that each element of its claim, including 
causation, is "more probably true than not true." IDJI 2d 1.20.1 (2007); see Earl v. C~yovac, 
I15 Idaho 1087, 1089, 772 P.2d 725, 727 (Ct. App. 1989). An act is a "proximate cause" of 
harm if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. IDJI 2d 2.30.2, 
Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 544, 164 P.3d 819, 824 (2007). Accordingly, a jury would 
consider whether Respondents' actions more prohably than not were a substantial factor in 
bringing about Wesco's damages. 
One who is harmed by tortious conduct, such as breach of the duty of loyalty or 
interference with contract or economic expectancy, is entitled to seek lost profits. See, e.g., 
Rockefeller, 136 Idaho at 646, 39 P.3d at 586 (agent is liable to the principal for any loss caused 
by the breach of fiduciary duty); McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 430 P.2d 670 
(1967) (allowing recovery of lost profits for tortious interference); Assoc. Tel. Directory 
Publishers, Znc. I .  File D $  Pub1 'g CO., Inc., 849 S.W.2d 894,898 (Tex. App. 1993) (lost profits 
are available for unfair competition claims); 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(ll) (2007) (including lost 
revenue among the remedies for a violation of the statute). 
When seeking lost profits, a plaintiff only need prove the amount of damages to a 
reasonable certainty. See Gr@th v. Clear Lake Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 
604, 61 1 (2007). Although "reasonable certainty" may sound daunting, it is not. According to 
this Court, "reasonable certainty" ineans that "the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the 
amount of damages from the realm of speculation." Gr$$th, 143 Idaho at 740, 152 P.3d at 61 1. 
Respondents are wrong to suggest that Wesco must eliminate potential "alternative" 
causes of Wesco's loss. Under Idaho law, the Respondents' conduct need not be the sole cause 
of the harm. IDJI 2d 2.30.2. There can be several legal causes of a loss. Id. If the jury finds 
that any one wrongful act is a substantial factor in causing the loss, then the tortfeasor is liable 
for all resulting damages. Id. In Rockefelfer the Court rejected the argument that an expert's 
failure to account for alternative causes of the harm rendered the expert's opinion inadmissible 
for lack of adequate foundation. Rockefeller, 136 Idaho at 646,39 P.3d at 586. 
Here, Wesco offered the expert opinion of David Smith. R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1383-98. 
Mr. Smith testified that the wrongful acts complained of here, which led to the loss of Wesco's 
entire Idaho workforce, in fact caused Wesco lo lose profits. R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1383-98. He 
further testified that other acts - such as the theft of trade secrets, the deletion of information, 
lying about the imminent mass resignation, and the use of the same cellphone numbers and the 
like were each substantial factors in reducing Wesco's sales. Id. Both Wesco and the 
Respondents produced extensive financial information to Smith on which he relied. R. Vol. 111, 
p. 1385 7 8, p. 1388 924. His calculations consequently are not speculative, nor are Smith's 
conclusions with regard to P&S's profits. Smith concludes that the Respondents' conduct was a 
substantial factor in causing approximately $4.5 million in damages suffered by Wesco. Id. 
Smith's testimony precludes summary judgment because a jury could reasonably believe Smith 
and conclude that the Respondents caused Wesco's damages, and that his calculation of 
approximately $4.5 million in damages is reasonably certain. The cases relied upon by 
Respondents do not change this result. 
For example, in Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 982 P.2d 945 
(1 999), the plaintiff's president acknowledged that there was no evidence that the new employer 
took any business from Magic Valley as the result of a former employee's breach of a 
noncompetition covenant; instead, the evidence simply showed that Magic Valley's revenues fell 
with the departure of the employee. Id. at 117,982 P.2d at 952. Here, there was ample evidence 
that that P&S acquired the customers formerly served by Wesco upon the wrongful mass 
departure of its employees. See, e.g., R. Vol. 111, pp. 475-76 (92:4 - 94:12). Furthermore, Mr. 
Smith directly linked the conduct of the remaining defendants to his reasonably certain damage 
calculation of $4.5 million. R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1385-88 77 7-25. Mr. Smith has never said, nor is 
he required to say, that the Respondents' wrongful conduct constituted the only cause of the loss 
suffered by Wesco. See IDJI 2d 2.30.2. Proximate cause does not require sole causation. Id. 
The law only requires that more probably than not the wrongful conduct was a substantial factor 
in bringing about the loss. Id. 1.20.1, 2.30.2. 
Similarly, in Dunn v. Ward, 105 Idaho 354, 357, 670 P.2d 59, 62 (1983), the plaintiff 
"presented no evidence at all showing any loss of business, loss of customers or loss of profit to 
bis own business attributable to [the defendant's] breach." Rather, the plaintiff attempted to 
recover based upon the defendant's profits, without correlating those profits to the plaintiffs 
losses. Id. Here, Wesco presented proof that it had in fact lost substantial business; its revenues 
sank from $11,000 per day to nothing. R. Vol. VIII, p. 1385 7 8. The Dunn decision 
demonstrates the fallacy of Respondents' argument that the "existence" of damages must be 
proved with "reasonable certainty."' As noted by the Court in Dunn, "although lost profits are 
not always susceptible of mathematically accurate proof, they must be proven with reasonable 
certainty." Dunn v. Ward, 105 Idaho at 356, 670 P.2d at 61. This clearly refers to the measure 
of damages, not the "existence" or "causation" of harm. 
Trilogy Networks Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 11 19 (2007), also suffers 
from the defect noted in Dunn v. Ward. When the plaintiff lost a contract to the defendant as a 
result of the breach of a settlement agreement requiring defendant not to do business with a 
former customer, the plaintiff did nothing to prove its own lost profits. It presented no evidence 
of its likely actual costs to perform the contract; instead, the plaintiffs president blandly asserted 
that the plaintiffs profit would have been similar to the profit realized by defendant. Trilogy, 
144 Idaho at 847, 172 P.3d at 1122. In short, the plaintiff failed to adequately correlate the 
defendant's profit with the plaintiffs lost profit; consequently, the claim failed for failure of 
proof of the quantum of damages. 
Respondents argue that Wesco has failed to prove that its damages were not going to 
occur even without defendants' wrongful conduct, relying upon IDJI 2d 2.30.1, which provides 
that "[ilt is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred 
' Wesco has found no case requiring "reasonable certainty" as to causation or the "existence" of 
damages. Rather, "reasonable certainty" is only required with respect to the quantum of lost 
profits. 
anyway." They argue without citation to any facts in the record that other potential causes of 
Wesco's damages might include, for example, the existence of new P&S stores; the lawful 
recruitment of key employees by P&S; lawful competition from key employees; the employees 
were at-will; competition from employees who were not bound by noncompete agreements; the 
goodwill already enjoyed by Ernest and Davis; the lawful resignation of at-will employees; 
Wesco's alleged "poor relationship" with its employees; and so forth. Resp. Br. at 39. The list is 
wildly speculative; it is surprising that Respondents did not also add potential cataclysms like a 
meteor strike. Even if there were factual and legal support for any of these alternative causes 
(which Wesco does not concede), there is no evidence in the record that any of these causes 
would have affected Wesco in exactly the same way as the abrupt, wrongfully-induced mass 
departure of its employees. 
There is substantial reason to believe that IDJI 2d 2.30:l does not accurately state the law 
in a multiple cause case. In several cases, this Court has held that in a multiple-cause case it is 
improper to instruct the jury that "[ilt is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely 
would have occurred anyway." See, e.g., Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 Idaho 591, 593, 818 P.2d 295, 
297 (1 991); Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 289-91, 127 P.3d 187, 192-94 (2005); Garcia 
v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 544, 164 P.3d 819, 824 (2007). And, even if the instruction does 
accurately state the law, Respondents do not cite any authority for the proposition that Wesco 
bears the burden of proving this negative. IDJI 2d 2.30.1 appears more in the nature of an 
affirmative defense, on which Respondents would hear the burden of proof. In other words, 
Wesco having proved that the Respondents' acts were more probably than not a substantial 
factor in causing the injury, the burden should shift to Respondents to prove that "the injury, loss 
or damage likely would have occurred anyway." 
Cudahy Co. v. Am. Labs., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Neb. 1970), relied upon by 
Respondents, does not apply. In Cudahy, a diversity case that applied Nebraska law, plaintiffs 
employee, in violation of his employment agreement, provided certain raw materials to a 
competitor. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove damages because there was no 
evidence that the competitor could not have obtained the raw materials from another source. Id., 
313 F. Supp. at 1349. The court held as much despite citing no authority and admitting that it 
had not requested briefing on the subject. Id. As such, it is easily distinguished. Here, Wesco 
presented evidence that Ernest, Davis, and the departing Wesco employees knew that the abrupt, 
en masse defection of Wesco's employees would have a "fairly negative impact on Wesco's 
ability to continue in operation." R. Vol. 111, p. 497 (37:25-38:5). The evidence shows that the 
industry involved is highly technical, such that one cannot simply hire and train someone with no 
experience in the industry and expect them to do the same work. R. Vol. IV, p. 3; R. Vol. IV, p. 
666 (54:lO - 55:7). In order to be effective, a salesperson needs background and training in the 
industry. Indeed, if it were so easy to find and train such a salesperson, there would have been 
no reason for P&S to steal Wesco's workforce. 
For all of Respondents' conviction that Trugveen Cos., L.L.C. v. Scotts Lawn Sew., 508 
F. Supp. 2d 937 (2007) is "amazingly similar" to Wesco's, Resp. Br. at 38, there is no similarity 
whatsoever. Causation and damages were not at issue; rather, the court dismissed claims against 
the Idaho defendants because it found no genuine issue as to improper means or purpose. Id., 
508 F. Supp. 2d at 956. In other words, the court dismissed because it found no actionable 
conduct at all - not because there was no causal link between actionable conduct and ensuing 
damages. Trugreen Cos., L.L.C. v. Mower Bros., Inc., 2007 WL 1696860 (D. Utah) ("Trugreen 
11"), also does not dictate dismissal. Even if this Court were to consider it, Trugreen II does not 
help Respondents. Unlike T w e e n  II, Wesco's position is supported by Mr. Smith's 
supplemental report and affidavit. R. Vol. VIII, pp. 1383-98. There are sufficient facts in the 
record upon which the jury may rely and make reasonable inferences. Moreover, Mr. Smith's 
testimony is unnecessary because causation does not inherently require expert testimony. 
Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 785, 25 P.3d 88, 98 (2001). Causation 
can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id., 135 Idaho at 785, 25 P.3d at 98. Expert 
testimony is only required when issues in the case require specialized or technical knowledge to 
explain the evidence and assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence. IDAHO R. EVID. 
702 (2007). This is a case where causation does not require expert testimony. The jury can infer 
causation based solely on the facts presented by direct or circumstantial evidence. There is 
sufficient evidence in the record favorable to Wesco. Unlike Trugreen, Wesco does not solely 
rely on its foundational statements for what it intends to prove at trial. Wesco relies on its 
owners' testimony, Smith's testimony, and all of the evidence in this case for its theory of 
causation and calculation of damages. 
The discussion set forth on page 40 of Respondents' brief is built upon the argument that 
Wesco must prove that "the injury, loss or damage likely would [not] have occurred anyway." 
Although not as fantastic as a meteor strike, Respondents do invoke the image of Barkdull on a 
desert island with no telecommunications access. Whatever the imagery, it is not for Wesco to 
prove a negative if the Respondents' acts were more probably than not a substantial factor in 
causing the harm experienced. Having presented ample evidence from which such causation 
may be inferred, the matter is now for the jury. 
The same applies to the discussion at page 41 of Respondents' brief. It is not for Wesco 
to prove a negative, and Mr. Smith has testified that the drafting of a resignation letter and the 
dissemination of that letter breached the fiduciary duty Cook owed to Wesco: R. Vol. VIII, p. 
1386 77 11-13. The composition of the letter was a substantial factor and contributor to the en 
masse resignation of the employees. Id. 7 12. There is a direct causal link between Cook's 
wrongful conduct, the departure of Wesco's employees, and Wesco's lost profits. Accordingly, 
summary judgment would be improper. 
2. There Are Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluding Summary 
Dismissal of Claims for Unfair Competition. 
The Respondents engaged in unfair competition, and the trial court's commentary on the 
evidence should not limit Wesco's unfair competition claim to only the issues of "wearing P&E 
clothing while working for P&S" or the maintenance of P&E cell phone numbers for the 
employees while employed with P&S. The law governing summary judgment proceedings 
requires only that the Court determine whether there are questions of material fact for a jury to 
decide. See IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c). Judge Smith's comments also do not exclude claims for the 
use of the P&S name in the markets where Wesco's stores are located. Judge Smith only 
addressed the selection of the P&S name and never considered the use of the name in the 
Southeastern Idaho market. It is the use and presence of the name in the market that gives rise to 
unfair competition. 
Idaho recognizes the tort of unfair competition. See Cazier v. Economy Cash Stores, 71 
Idaho 178, 228 P.2d 436 (1951). The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law 
tort of deceit; its general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source. 
Woodland Furniture, LLC V.  Larsen, 142 Idaho 140, 147, 124 P.3d 1016, 1023 (2005). This 
Court has said: 
A dealer coming into a field already occupied by a rival of established reputation 
must do nothing which will unnecessarily create or increase confusion between 
his goods or business and the goods or business of his rival. Owing to the nature 
of the goods dealt in, or the common use of terms which are publici juris, some 
confusion and damage may he inevitable, but anything done which unnecessarily 
increases this confusion and damage to the established trade constitutes unfair 
competition. 
Am. Home Benejt Ass'n, Inc. v. United Am. Benefit Ass'n, Inc., 63 Idaho 754, 763, 125 P.2d 
1010, 1014 (1942). In cases where similar names exist and confusion as to source exists, "it is 
sufficient to show that such deception will be the natural and probable result of the defendants' 
acts." Id. at 764, 125 P.2d at 1015. Similarity of names, regardless of when the names were 
registered with the state, is probative of confusion. See D.L. Anderson's Lakeside Leisure Co., 
Inc. v. Anderson, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 955, "P38. Both the proximity of the businesses to 
each other, the overlap in products provided or services rendered, and marketing methods all go 
to the issue of unfair competition. Id. 
Wesco does not need to show actual confusion; instead, the legal test for unfair 
competition is the likelihood of confusion. See Am. Home Benejt Ass'n, 63 Idaho at 764, 125 
P.2d at 1015. Mr. Smith's supplemental report and affidavit establish that the use of the P&S 
name in the new markets, the use of the cell phones, and the use of P&E clothing more probably 
than not caused confusion as to source. R. Vol. VIII, p. 1387 r/n 20-21. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that Brady did not change his cell phone number until the Court ordered him to do so. 
R. Vol. 111, p. 477 (98:6-13). The P&S stores were located within blocks of the Wesco stores. R, 
Vol. I, p. 12 7 35. 
The trial court properly denied the renewed motion for summary judgment 
3. There Are Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluding Summary 
Dismissal of Wesco's CFAA Claim. 
Cook's Wesco computer qualifies as a protected computer under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA). A protected computer under the CFAA is any computer "used in interstate 
or foreign commerce or commu~~ication." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2008). Cook's computer 
was used in interstate commerce and in an industry affecting interstate commerce, thus the 
Respondents' arguments fail. 
Two months prior to the sale of the Paint & Equipment stores to Wesco, the Paint & 
Equipment computers were connected via DSL to the intemet. R. Vol. 111, p. 485 (12:5-10). This 
was done to get away .from the frame relay system that had previously been in place. Id. (12113). 
Prior to the DSL connection, the computers were connected to Paint & Equipment's intranet out of 
Washington. Id. (13:2-4). The offices in Washington could access the computers in Idaho and take 
information directly off the Idaho computers. Id. (16:2-4). Cook's computer was located in the 
Pocatello store. Because the computer was connected to servers in Washington, and communicated 
with servers in Washington, then the computer was used in interstate commercial activity. 
Certainly, once the computer was connected to the internet the computer became a protected 
computer. 
The frame relay connection and the internet connection are fatal to the Respondents' 
arguments. In United States v. Kiinler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003), the defendant appealed his 
conviction for the distribution of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 5 2252(a), claiming that the 
statute was unconstitutional because "there was no evidence that interstate commerce was 
substantially affected, and the mere fact that he had internet access, without more, cannot satisfy the 
interstate commerce count of the statute." Id. at 1139. The court rejected the argument because 
"every transmission from his computer via the internet necessarily cross state lines . . . . [Tlhe jury 
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the interstate commerce element of the statute was 
constitutionally applied." Id. at 1139-40. Thus, the fact that the computer had internet access 
eviscerates the Respondents' arguments. See also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 
1139-40 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding defendant's conviction under federal threat to injurekidnap 
statute after defendant sent bomb threat over AOL's Instant Messenger to recipient in same state; 
because threat was routed through AOL's server in Virginia, while defendant and recipient of 
message were in Utah, the communication was interstate). 
There are serious questions of material fact whether Cook caused damage to the Wesco 
computer that he used. Cook admits that he deleted information from the computer. Deleting 
information from a computer impairs the integrity of the information contained on the computer. 
See Worldspan, L.P., v. Orbitz, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 26153 (N.D. Ill. 2006). The term 
"integrity" connotes the diminution in the complete nature or usability of the data or information 
contained on the computer. Id. Cook's conduct diminished the integrity and availability of the 
information on the computer.6 Wesco suffered significant losses as a result. 
In this case, Cook deleted information &om Wesco's computers when he terminated his 
employment with Wesco. The information deleted contained customer lists, customer telephone 
Additionally, Cook did not just remove the information from the computer. Wes Goodwin, 
Wesco's computer forensics expert, testified that the information was copied. R. Vol. 11, pp: 
307-407. 
numbers, a sales calculator, car show information, and letters to customers written on behalf of 
Cook's employer. R. Vol. 111, pp. 487-88 (215-25:20). When Wesco attempted to open its 
doors after the mass defection, this information was unavailable to Wesco. The absence of this 
information caused an interruption in services at a critical time for Wesco and hindered Wesco's 
capacity to deal with the crisis in which it found itself. The interruption in service caused by 
Cook's actions is the quintessential predicate to recovering lost revenue under the CFAA. See 
Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19099, *10 (M.D. Fla 2005). Lost 
revenue that resulted from the interruption of service caused by the damage to Wesco's protected 
computer is a recognized remedy under the statute. The term loss is defined in the statute: 
The term loss means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of 
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, restoring the date, 
program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any 
revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of 
interruption of service. 
18 U.S.C. 5 1030(e)(l1). Mr. Smith made the causal connection between the deletions of the 
information contained on the computer to Wesco's lost profits. R. Vol. VIII, p. 1387 71 17-19. 
There are therefore genuine issues of material fact as to causation and damages suffered by 
Wesco as a result of Cook's conduct with his Wesco computer. The trial court did not err in 
denying summary judgment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order granting partial summary judgment to 
respondentsldefendants should be reversed, the cross-appeal dismissed, and this case remanded 
for trial. 
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